



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
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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Report

*Red Power and Prospects in Italy*

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87

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## RED POWER AND PROSPECTS IN ITALY

### Summary

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## INTRODUCTION

Much has changed since the late 1940s when the US had to take seriously the possibility of a Communist coup in Italy or an outright election victory of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Today the definition of the party's present and future impact on American interests in Italy is considerably more complicated.

In one of the fairly gradual changes, Italians have come to accept the PCI more and more as a normal political party. The Vatican's own recognition of the durability of Communist regimes and its consequent pragmatic view of its relations with Communist-controlled countries encourage the Italian attitude.

Moreover, the long-standing hope of Italy's non-Communist reformers that the PCI would decline is dying. They had expected the party's political strength to erode as social and economic justice for the poor improved in Italy. But, in fact, despite substantial and steady gains in these fields, the PCI's role in practical politics is rising.

Rome itself has grown increasingly independent of Washington. Italy, as much as any European country and more than most, has experienced economic recovery and gone on to unprecedented prosperity so that total economic dependence on the US is a thing of the past. The concomitant political dependence on the US of the early postwar governments is now beginning to decline.

At the same time, the political relations between Washington and Moscow have changed. The brink-of-war atmosphere, engendered particularly by crises over Berlin, has given way to a controlled rivalry that permits such civilized exercises as the SALT talks.

The old picture of the PCI as a movement likely to lead to violent revolution is seemingly out of date. On the other hand, the conception of the party as an instrument antagonistic to the US has not been invalidated.

Although the PCI seems far less inclined toward violence than in the early postwar years, it is as interested as ever in power. In domestic politics the party is already playing an important role—dominant at lower levels of government in some areas and influential at the national level. Through democratic procedures and an increasing role in the interplay of Italian

*Note: This report was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Office of National Estimates, the Directorate for Plans, and the Central Reference Service were consulted in the drafting and are in general agreement with its findings.*

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political parties, the PCI now seems to be moving toward a position of influence in Italian foreign policy.

As for the PCI's vaunted and much-discussed "Italian road to Socialism," which has often been interpreted to mean virtual independence from Moscow, both the history of the party and the attitudes of its members strongly indicate that the PCI finds it essential to be part of an international movement and, in fact, is neither able nor likely to break with the Soviet Union. The Soviets, for their part, seem willing to concede considerable autonomy to the PCI in its domestic policy. They demand, however, that it adhere to Soviet views on foreign policy questions where the American interest in Italy is heavily concentrated. It is clear therefore that PCI susceptibility to Soviet influence will be exploited in ways that will concern the US.

\* \* \*

This paper examines the largest Communist Party in the West to determine its present status and prospects in Italian Society. To form a basis for judgment, it describes how the party is set up, how it resembles a democratic party, what the characteristics of its members are, how the party achieves consensus and to what degree factionalism is nevertheless present. The relationship of the PCI to the Soviet Union is examined because it is from this relationship that US problems with the PCI are most likely to arise. A description of the PCI's sources of electoral strength has been included and particular consideration has been given to the nonparty vote for the PCI, which many observers believed was contingent on the PCI's role as a nongovernment party and described as a protest vote. Lastly the paper examines the impact the PCI's strength in government is likely to have in the fields which have aroused various kinds of American opposition to Communist government.

The conclusions of the paper are the following:

1. The PCI has taken on many of the aspects of a democratic political party.
2. The PCI has not cut its ties with the Soviet Union and is unlikely to do so.
3. The PCI's activity in local government is going well and is expanding.
4. The PCI is enlarging its role in national legislation.



5. The PCI is doing well politically within Italy and has disarmed much of its opposition.

6. It is highly unlikely that the PCI will gain control of the Italian Government within the foreseeable future.

7. The PCI may, however, achieve membership in a national coalition, either with the Christian Democrats alone or with the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.

8. In domestic policy, agreement between Italy's Communists and non-Communists on the priority of economic development is likely to provide a basis for a considerable period of cooperation and consolidation of the PCI's political role.

9. The main problems that PCI membership in a national coalition government would pose for the US would center on Communist efforts, under Soviet pressure, to reorient Italian foreign policy away from its traditional close ties with the US and its active membership in NATO.

# GEOGRAPHIC ZONES OF ITALY





## I. WHAT'S THE PARTY LIKE?

The PCI is in many respects an ordinary political party. Its socioeconomic background, for example, is similar to that of some other left-of-center parties in Western Europe. It, like the Social Democratic Party in West Germany and the Labor Party in Britain, includes a relatively large share of poor voters with little education. But unlike the situation in these two foreign democratic parties the poor who belong to the PCI divide between city and countryside as they do in the Italian Socialist Party.



Italian political parties typically have some strength in every major region of Italy. The PCI is normal in this respect. When the party first operated freely in the immediate postwar period, the areas of the Resistance in northern and central Italy contributed the bulk of party recruits, but since then a substantial membership has developed in the islands of Sicily and Sardinia as well as in the peninsular south.

In organization, too, the PCI has over the past ten years moved closer to its non-Communist competitors. Like the Christian Democratic Party, the PCI is organized for the most part on the basis of provincial divisions with subsidiary units, known as sections, which have a geographic rather than an occupational base. The party cell, a key characteristic of the Leninist concept of Communist party organization, has decreased steadily in number and importance since the late 1950s despite repeated proposals on the national level for reinvigorating this unit of organization. In Naples, in fact, no cell meeting has been held in years, according to Communist Federal Deputy Macciocchi. Throughout the country, cells and sections are now evidently scarce in the factories and almost nonexistent in other places of work.

The normal political party in Italy, as elsewhere in Western Europe, has relatively older leadership than, for example, the political parties in Africa or Latin America. PCI leaders were once characterized by their extreme youth, but now they are approximately the same age as those of the Christian Democratic Party, and the PCI, like the government parties, has serious problems with the juveniles it would like to indoctrinate. Leadership selection appears to operate in fairly normal fashion, with incumbents exerting great influence on the choice of future leaders.

Like the other Italian political parties of consequence, the PCI is a major source of jobs for its adherents. Although the PCI cannot compete

## MEMBERSHIP OF THE PCI AND ITS YOUTH FEDERATION



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with the Christian Democrats and Socialists in providing jobs in the national bureaucracy, it does control a substantial number of jobs in municipal and provincial governments. The party itself also has a considerable number of paid officials. In addition, PCI business enterprises provide a wide variety of jobs on all levels of skill.

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#### Membership and Recruitment




The party has shown a considerable decline in its officially claimed membership from its peak of 2,145,317 in 1954. The number of members inscribed in the PCI on 31 December 1969 and 31 December 1970 amounted to 1,503,181, and 1,507,047 respectively, slight increases over the 1968 figures. Communist party figures are more meaningful in Italy than in most non-Communist countries because all party members must be re-registered annually. However, the PCI may have inflated the figures for 1969 and 1970 by permitting issuance of party cards for both current and following years to new recruits who signed up during the month of December. If this practice—unknown in prior years—had not been followed, it seems probable that the 1969 and 1970 membership figures would have shown a loss instead of a gain. This is so to a considerable extent because of the PCI's difficulties in recruiting young adults.

The party's youth organization has shown an even more sharply declining trend than the parent organization as is discussed in subsection 2, *The Age Question*. The organization decreased from 463,000 in 1950 to about 120,000 in 1970. (See Graphic No. 1)

The socioeconomic composition of the party (See Graphic No. 2) deviates from the stereotype for Communist parties principally in the relatively small segment occupied by urban workers. This group, which is traditionally given credit for the great bulk of party membership, in fact has made up less than half of the total over the past two decades. About 40 percent of the Italian Communist Party membership are urban workers, some 25 percent are agricultural workers or sharecroppers, about 10 percent are small farmers, artisans, or white collar workers, only one percent are students or professionals, and the remaining fourth of the party is made up



## SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PCI MEMBERSHIP



largely of "housewives" or those retired on social security. According to Communist Federal Deputy Maria Macciocchi, a large number of those listed as housewives are employed full time at home on nonunion piece work such as glove-stitching.


Over the past two decades, the principal changes in party composition have been the drop in rural members and the substantial increase in pensioners. The decrease in the agricultural segment reflects general demographic trends in Italy more than a change in the party's appeal. The increase in pensioners combines with the sharp drop in the party's youth organization membership (See Graphic No. 1) to indicate a considerable aging of party membership.

The party claims to represent the proletariat, and, in fact, most Italian Communists are poor. Most Italian poor nevertheless are not Communist. The party dominates neither the urban nor the rural proletariat. A 1963 survey showed 37 percent of agricultural workers preferring the Communist Party while 49 percent (28 and 21 percent respectively) preferred the Socialists or Christian Democrats. Among urban manual workers, 29 percent preferred the Communists and 59 percent (34 and 25 percent respectively) preferred the Socialists or Christian Democrats. The party is only slightly, if at all, more successful among the less educated urban workers, attracting 30 percent of those with less than five years of schooling according to Sydney Tarrow.\*


New member enrollment is a major preoccupation for the PCI, which fears a continuation of the drop in membership figures of the past 15 years. Several misconceptions prevail concerning recruitment of PCI members. Since the end of the Second World War, recruitment into the PCI has been repeatedly described as heaviest in the industrial cities, such as Turin and Milan. It has been explained as resulting from party help for migrants from southern Italy to the north. In fact, party membership in the industrial triangle formed by Turin, Milan and Genoa has declined, as has membership in big cities both north and south (See Graphics 3 and 4). The reasons for the consistent decline in the party's city membership are not entirely clear, but may be related to the fact that Italy's extraordinary postwar economic growth has been more beneficial to this segment of its population than to any other. While some workers winning substantial economic gains in the Central regions, or Red Belt, may remain Communist in order to benefit from the partisan preference of local officials, similar reasoning does not

*\*See Bibliography*


# **PCI MEMBERSHIP BY GEOGRAPHIC ZONES**




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
**1950**



**1956**



**1960**



**1968**

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keep Communist workers in the PCI in the big industrial cities farther north, where center-left governments are common.

Potential recruits in the north appear to become familiar with the party primarily through labor activity, but actual recruitment has had very little success there over the past two decades. The backbone of stable new recruitment to the party takes place in the Red Belt of Italy, so-called because of its long tradition of left-wing political sympathy. This area had 34.5 percent of Italy's Communists in 1946 and 48.2 in 1968. PCI aid to migrants is a prominent factor here. One acute political observer reports, "One of the most politically profitable 'social' operations in which PCI-controlled organizations engage has been the guiding and assistance of urban immigrants whose steady flow (from both nearby countryside and the south) has increased the Bologna population by half in the last 20 years. These immigrants are warmly received by CGIL\* or party-sponsored welcoming committees and assisted in finding work and housing. They are quickly integrated into neighborhood social clubs or workers' organizations and made to feel secure and, eventually, at home in their new surroundings."


The concept of party appeal only to antiestablishment elements is also somewhat shaky. To a certain extent the PCI in the Red Belt attracts fundamentally conservative people who have come to regard Communist rule as the norm. Italian women, for example, tend to oppose the PCI in areas dominated by Christian Democrats and Socialists, but to support it in the Red Belt. Outside the Red Belt the PCI has had increasing difficulty over the last decade in getting and holding recruits, thus casting a shadow over the theory that attributes the PCI's appeal primarily to its opposition role. Other objections to this theory are outlined in Chapter 4.

The belief that the PCI has been unable to find members in the South is without foundation. There, success in recruitment in early postwar years owed a great deal to the party's strong position favoring land reform. More recently, recruitment has been helped by the party's tendency to have club-like headquarters in southern Italy with publicly available television. Political activity and electoral campaigns are important in recruitment in the south, but turnover of membership is considerably greater there than in other areas of the country, perhaps because of a certain de-emphasis of ideology. The party has not substantially increased its membership in the South in the past 15 years, but it has come closer to holding its own gains of the first postwar decade there than in the northern regions.

*\*Italian General Confederation of Labor*



## COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTH IN SELECTED CITIES, 1956 AND 1968



The reasons for consistent decline in the Party's city membership are not entirely clear, but may be related to the fact that Italy's extraordinary postwar economic growth has been more beneficial to this segment of Italy's population than to any other. While some workers winning substantial economic gains in the Red Belt may remain Communist in order to benefit from the partisan preference of local officials, similar reasoning does not keep Communist workers in the PCI in the big industrial cities where center-left governments are common.



Recruitment takes place not so much during labor strikes as during the annual membership drive when old members are expected and urged to repurchase party cards and new members are enrolled. Many party sections sponsor parties of various kinds—picnics, social gatherings with games of chance, etc.—and in the course of the festivities recruitment takes place. The drive begins in November and is most intense during the first three months of the following year.

### The Age Question

Critics have charged that the party has gone stale with an aging leadership and that it has lost its sense of purpose. They claim that the party's deterioration is evident in an increasing failure to attract young people to its ranks. In fact, the PCI has serious problems in this respect, although no greater than those of the other major Italian parties.

The party's youth organization has been outflanked on the left in recent years by both the Student Movement and various self-styled pro-Chinese groups. The party insisted that its younger adherents should generally stay out of the violent encounters with the police in which youth groups of the extreme left have taken part. PCI youth has been held to peaceful demonstrations against NATO, visiting US officials, and delays in university reform, while its peers have been advocating violent action.

The existence of the frictions between the PCI and potential young recruits has been emphasized by critics both inside and outside the party, and the problem is confirmed in the membership decline of about 75 percent in the Federation of Communist Youth over the past two decades. (See Graphic No. 1)

Among workers, both in the city and the country, the percentage supporting the party increases with age, according to Sydney Tarrow.\* The age composition of the party is now much the same as that of the general adult population of the country. About 20 percent of the party membership is under 30, half is between 30 and 50, and 30 percent of the party is over 50.

Critics have charged that one reason for the party's failure to attract youth is that the PCI leadership is aging and is unwilling to take younger men into its ranks. The average age of the party leadership, however, is not rising now, as it was in the immediate postwar period. The average age in

\*See Bibliography

1946 was 45. It had risen by 1956 to 52 but it was still 52 in 1970. Acting Secretary General Berlinguer himself was 48. Many of the founding members like Luigi Longo had stayed in leadership since the party began in 1921, when they were in their twenties. Several of these men are now gone. The top five Communists had an average age of 58 in 1970, two years older than the top five Christian Democrats, but the removal of Longo, who is ailing, would eliminate the disparity.

Thus, despite the much advertised disillusionment of Italian youth with the PCI, the party is not at an age disadvantage compared to its Christian Democratic and Socialist rivals.

#### **Internal Party Debate**

Communist local leaders display an extraordinary reluctance to discuss internal party matters openly. Certain topics, they believe, are properly debated only with other PCI members. While PCI leaders readily comply with requests for opinions and statistics, outsiders are almost invariably refused permission to attend problem discussions at Communist section meetings. The party goes to great lengths, moreover, to ensure an appearance of party harmony rather than free-swinging debate at such public events as the party's national congresses.

Left-wing PCI leader Pietro Ingrao commented on party debate in the following terms: "Our party seeks to resolve differences insofar as possible not through the counting of votes but through the quest for a unitary position which takes discussion into account." He said that in many cases, when the resolution of conflicting positions appears particularly arduous, the Central Committee prefers to postpone decisions until respective positions can be given further study. "As far back as I can remember," he said, "the Central Committee has always avoided pushing matters to the breaking point." Ingrao went on: "It goes without saying that a unanimity of votes does not necessarily mean that all dissension has ended and that everybody agrees on everything. As a rule it means that a given view has been endorsed by a majority and that those comrades who still have objections prefer to stress the unity of party action rather than the public expression of disagreement." Ingrao went on to say that the PCI did not want to be like Social Democrats and discuss things so long that no time was left for action.

The most revealing and accurate descriptions of internal PCI activity come from high-level Communists now suspended from the party on an indefinite basis, who over the past two years have been publishing their views. Considerable party time is spent on general bureaucratic activity, they

report, and little on substantive discussion. An article in the dissidents' monthly *Il Manifesto* said: "Despite the many efforts which have been made, the party sections have never succeeded in placing at the center of their activity the problems of the factories or of the schools in their territory, and hence constructing a real movement. In great part, they are involved in routine work on membership, fund-raising, or press circulation. In the small centers, especially in the Red zones, there is also the work of directing the representatives in the local municipality; in the large centers, a certain amount of debate with the non-Communists must be undertaken. This pattern of work is interrupted by the election campaigns (which, however, have necessarily lost the character of total mobilization which they had in the 1950s) and also by the great political events (Czechoslovakia, the question of whether Communist rulers should permit non-Communist political parties, the French events of May 1968), which arouse, right at the rank-and-file level, heated discussions which are precisely discussions 'on the events which happen' more than on the 'events to be made to happen.'"

At the Federation level too, the organization's administrative work is quite absorbing. "Minute and laborious checking of the membership-enrollment activity and of the press campaign takes the energy of many people for many months of the year. In addition to this, there are the often complicated questions of job assignments and the miserable task of balancing the books. The time and energy which remain are mostly devoted to direction of Communist policy in the local administrations, the frequent election campaigns, the problems of the key positions for the mass organizations, and finally the 'orientation' of the active members with regard to the great political matters. If we analyze the calendar of a Federation Committee or of an executive organ, we find that the activity of working out the program of struggle, of constructing the movement, and of tactical direction of it proves actually to be marginal and is delegated instead, with the 'supervision' (often of a general kind) of the party, to the trade union organizations."

#### Selection of leaders\*

Experience in party organization appears to be the main qualification for reaching the top in the PCI. Prolonged residence or training in the USSR is rarely found in the background of the top Italian Communists. Many, however, were active in the party's youth organizations, and a position in the party press has helped others climb to the top. Labor activity is a field which thus far has not proved a particular help to Italian Communists in achieving

\*See Appendix A

[REDACTED]

the higher reaches of party direction. Activity in the political field is more of an asset. Eight of nine members of the PCI Politburo are federal deputies. About 20 percent of the Communist members of parliament are on the Central Committee, where they constitute about one third of the total—percentages that have remained nearly constant for the past 15 years.

The pro forma aspects of the selection process were illustrated some years ago when Ugo Pecchioli,\* who had made a name for himself and had gained friends at the top through PCI youth activities, was first appointed regional secretary in Turin. Party regulations specify that the Federal Committee, the Control Commission, and the Provincial Council act jointly to elect a new provincial secretary. Pecchioli's appointment, however, was officially announced in the press some ten days before these groups met. This appointment illustrates the party hierarchy's tendency to minimize the importance of a labor background. Labor criticized the appointment of Pecchioli, saying that he was the man least fitted for the job in industrial Turin because he had never worked in a factory and had no history of being involved in labor affairs.

*Communist dissidents commented accurately in their monthly magazine Il Manifesto on the Party's method of selecting leaders as follows: In the PCI, the fundamental mechanism for choosing leaders is co-optation, the mechanism of selection or election to a group by vote of its own members. What sustains this method is a set of unwritten laws and habits such as, for example, the purely formal election of the election committees, which are in reality composed of the preceding directing groups; the holding of the elections almost always on the basis of closed slates; the intervention of the higher bodies in the selection of the officials of the lower ones; the power of the executive organs over those constituted by direct election; and the large number of important functions (press, central machinery, study centers) which lack a precise statutory framework and which are subordinate to the central directing group in a direct and unlimited manner.*

*Nevertheless, this method, mitigated only by a tolerant and open procedure, has very serious limitations in the long run.*

*The first limitation comes from the fact that every militant finds himself depending, when he asserts himself, more on the judgment of those who outrank him than on the judgment of his peers, and therefore he is led not only to avoid a political disagreement with those in the higher ranks but also to avoid initiatives*

\*Secretariat member, see chart p. 19

[ ]

*susceptible of error or failure, which are more perilous than carrying out his assigned duties in a serious and humble manner. The militant wins a relative political freedom only by acquiring membership in the national directing group or by having personal claims to distinction in society. Consequently the paradox arises of greater politico-organizational imaginativeness and creativity at the center than on the periphery, and the high-level leader, with all the responsibilities which he bears, shows himself more daring than a young federation secretary. Another limitation, even more serious, is connected with the relatively small size of the real (national) directing group, which has the effect that for a large number of officials, the prospect of advancement is not identified with political promotion to a directing post in the party but rather with a rise in social standing culminating in election to parliament.*

In fact, the so-called social promotions to a parliamentary seat are a phenomenon contributing to the PCI's evolution toward quasi-normal political party status. The member of parliament establishes a certain local autonomy on the basis of his career as a legislator. As in the democratic parties, personal and electoral considerations then sometimes prevail over the course of action dictated by a strict construction of the party line.

#### **The Secretaries General**

Achieving the post of PCI Secretary General has thus far required Soviet approval as well as a successful party career. As incumbents, however, the Italians have tended to show greater independence of the Soviet Party than they did as aspirants for the post.

The Italian Communist Party came into being in 1921 as a pro-Moscow splinter of the Socialist Party, which had applied for membership in the Communist International but then split over accepting all the conditions imposed by the Soviets. Amadeo Bordiga sided with Moscow in the schism and became the first head of the Italian Communist Party. The first major shift in the party's top leadership, which came in 1923, also reflected the interests of the Soviets. Donald Blackmer of MIT, commenting on this period, says, "When the USSR, having for the time-being abandoned hope of revolution in Europe, adopted a tactic of united action with the Socialists, the new line was only grudgingly accepted by Bordiga, the PCI's insurrection-minded leader. Antonio Gramsci won the leadership job from Bordiga by demonstrating not only his adherence to the substance of Soviet policy but his acceptance of the basic principle that the Comintern's authority was to be unconditionally recognized."




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Blackmer further comments that Palmiro Togliatti seemed in the mid-1920s more loyal to the USSR than Gramsci, whom he succeeded de facto after the PCI chief's arrest in 1926 and de jure after Gramsci's death in prison in 1937. "In reply to a worried letter from Gramsci, who was disturbed by Stalin's evident willingness to wreck the unity of the Bolshevik party by imposing stiff disciplinary measures against Trotsky and other oppositionists, Togliatti brusquely dismissed the complaint, insisting on the impossibility of meddling in Soviet affairs and on the need for absolute trust in the actions of the Soviet leadership."

Once in power, Togliatti, like Gramsci and Bordiga before him, seemed to be less blindly loyal to Moscow than when he was a mere aspirant for power. Ignazio Silone, the Italian writer who was a prewar member of the party, says that in this period the Italian Communists believed that they could defend their own organization and policies from invalid criticism if they stayed together. Silone notes that Togliatti seemed sincerely committed to this, and in private meetings even insisted strongly that they were protected only when agreement was unanimous. When some members objected, Togliatti pointed to the experience of the Spanish Communist party (PCE): The majority of the members of the PCE had opposed certain arbitrary Muscovite demands, Togliatti said, whereupon the party had been dissolved and some young men of a pro-Moscow minority had been appointed to re-establish it. Such a minority capable of obeying a nod from Moscow to bring its own country's party to heel existed in Italian Communism as well, according to Togliatti, and Silone notes, "it was represented even then by (later Secretary General) Longo and (Pietro) Secchia."

Togliatti himself ran into fairly serious difficulties with the Soviets from time to time during his long tenure as Secretary General and by the end of his career had come to be regarded as an apostle of relatively independent national paths to Communism.

The power transition in the PCI following Togliatti's death in 1964 apparently occurred smoothly and rapidly, but only because the succession problem had been fought out ahead of time. Old-line Communist Pietro Secchia, for example, was at one time a principal contender for Togliatti's job but had been dropped from the secretariat in 1955 in what some saw as a world-wide purge of the followers of the former Soviet police chief Lavrentiy Beria. Umberto Terracini, who had a claim as a charter member and close associate of Gramsci, did not qualify for the post of Secretary General, in part because he had acquired a reputation in the early postwar period as a leader of the PCI nationalist group. Luigi Longo, on the other



hand, had a history of consistent support of Moscow although he was often at odds with Togliatti. According to polemics in the PCI press in recent years, Longo even backed Moscow in the early 1950s when Stalin made an abortive attempt to move Togliatti from active leadership of the PCI to an international Communist post requiring residence in the Communist countries. In 1964, after Togliatti's death in the Crimea, Longo succeeded without question to the post of secretary general.

## II. FACTIONALISM IN THE PARTY

The apparent smoothness of the power transition from Togliatti to Longo in 1964 could not hide for long the divisions among other PCI figures and the beginning of the inevitable power struggle for succession to Longo. Conflict centered on two diverse and conflicting strategies advocated by Giorgio Amendola and Pietro Ingrao for Communist achievement of national government power. Amendola's proposal was for a unified workers' party, and Ingrao's was for a dialogue with the Catholics. As each group has tried to win over its opponents as well as the centrists of Longo and Enrico Berlinguer, the differences between the two positions have tended to become obscure. Basically, however, Amendola seems more inclined to develop political strength through an enlarging system of ad hoc alliances, while Ingrao seems more inclined to look for a common cause in some area of economic or social justice.

The concept of the Unified Workers' Party was raised by Amendola less than two months after Togliatti's death in a discussion of future PCI strategy in the party's theoretical journal *Rinascita*. Amendola began with what he called a "critical determination," namely that "neither of the two solutions proposed to the working classes of the capitalist countries of Western Europe over the past 50 years (the Social Democratic and the Communist solutions) has proved itself able, as of today, to realize a Socialist transformation of society, i.e., a change in the system.... A political organization which has not reached its objectives in half a century, with the cooperation of three generations of militants, must seek the reasons for this failure and must know how to transform itself." Hence the necessity for the creation of a "unified party of the working class," which would encompass all the forces from the PCI to the Christian Democratic left wingers, and which "must be, necessarily, a new party capable of elaborating a new strategy and a new policy of the struggle for socialism in our country." Amendola amplified his thoughts with the heretical statement that the new party could not be built either on Social Democratic or on Communist positions, for in either case the result would be not unification but the absorption of one into the other.

Ingrao's "Dialogue with the Catholics," as it has emerged over a considerable period of time in his speeches and writings, starts from his own "critical determination" that the "Catholic masses" are becoming increasingly aware that in order to extricate the Italian system from crisis, they must "go toward a meeting with the Communists." Hence his proposal for a joint Communist-Catholic assault on the system itself at all levels—economic,

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social and political. Although Ingrao does not necessarily exclude the idea that such a dialogue can be carried on with the Christian Democratic party as a whole, he has repeatedly indicated a preference for dealing with the Christian Democratic left wingers and with the less defined "Catholic masses." In essence, Ingrao proposes to work outside the system of organized political forces. Only thus, he believes, can the revolutionary nature of the PCI be preserved and its goal of the overthrow of the present system be achieved.

Neither Amendola's nor Ingrao's strategy was openly welcomed by the non-Communist political parties, and, within the PCI, the two strategies continued to clash. In the first several months after Togliatti's death, Ingrao seemed to be winning, but in December Longo switched toward Amendola following a test of strength in the Presidential election of 1964. Ingrao had advocated support for Christian Democrat Amintore Fanfani. Amendola, on the other hand, fought for a common effort with all the parties of the non-Communist left in support of the candidacy of Social Democrat Giuseppe Saragat. The Ingrao-Amendola struggle went on for a number of fruitless rounds of balloting during which the Communists, unable to make a decision, cast their votes for one of their own. Finally, the stalemate was broken when Amendola prevailed and the party threw its backing to Saragat, thus ensuring his victory.

Three major factions\* now characterize the party: the so-called right wing of Giorgio Amendola, the so-called left wing of Pietro Ingrao, and the center of Enrico Berlinguer. Berlinguer seems at the moment to be in the strongest position but faces a strong challenge from Amendola, who has a considerable number of supporters. Ingrao is clearly in a weaker position than the other two leaders, but perhaps only temporarily. In addition, there are two important minor factions, the old Stalinists and the Manifesto group with incipient Maoist sympathies. Factors drawing support to an individual faction leader may include his willingness to accommodate to views of the party base, his past role in the party, his geographic origin, and his ideology and attitude toward Moscow. His personality is of less importance.

#### The Amendola Faction

Key politburo member Giorgio Amendola derives considerable party support from the fact that since Czechoslovakia he has taken a public

*\*Factions are not clearly organized and delineated in the PCI as they are in most Italian political parties. Factionalism as it is understood in American political life nevertheless exists in the PCI.*

# GRAPHIC FACTS ABOUT THE POLITBURO AND THE SECRETARIAT

Member's Name	Soviet Residence	Date of Birthday	Birthplace	Year Joined Party	Youth Activity	Has Been Linked With	Notable Press Experience
Luigi Longo Secretary-General Politburo & Secretariat	1933-35 when he was a member of the Plenum, Executive Committee and Political Commission of Comintern	15 Mar 1900	Fubine Monferato in Alessandria	1921	Yes	Togliatti	Avanguardia and L'Unita
Agostino Novella Politburo	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	28 Sep 1905	Genoa	1924	Secretary PCI Youth for Genoa 1925 for Lombardy 1926-27	Sometimes Amendola, sometimes Longo	None (Sec-Gen of CGIL)
Giencarlo Pajetta Politburo	Six months in 1931-32	24 Jun 1911	Turin	1925	Representative of clandestine Youth of Paris in Moscow	Amendola	Headed PCI's Press and Propaganda 1946-56
Giorgio Amendola Politburo	Frequent visits—no prolonged residence reported	21 Nov 1907	Rome	1926	Yes	Self	Publishing house Paris 1937-39 Director of Cronache Meridionali
Pietro Ingrao Politburo	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	30 Mar 1915	Lenola, Latina (a few miles south of Rome)	1940	Denies Fascist connections in 1934-35	Self	Editor of L'Unita
Enrico Berlinguer Politburo & Secretariat	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	26 May 1922	Cagliari, Sardinia	1943	Headed Youth Section for Rome 1944. Sec-Gen of FGCI 1946. Pres. of WEDY 1950-53	Togliatti	None
Emanuele Macaluso Politburo	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	24 Mar 1924	Caltanissetta Sicily	1940	No	Togliatti Longo	No
Giorgio Napolitano Politburo	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	29 Jun 1925	Naples	1945	Anti-Fascist student activities	Amendola	Co-editor Rinsacita and Cronache Meridionale
Aldo Tortorella Politburo	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	19 Jul 1926	Naples	probably early 1940s	Resistance activities	Ingrao/Longo	L'Unita Genoa & Milan
Paolo Bufalini Secretariat	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	9 Sep 1915	Rome	1937	none noted	Amendola	No
Fernando di Giulio Secretariat	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	27 Apr 1924	Grosseto (Tuscany)	1942	No except partisan activity	Berlinguer	No
Ugo Pecchioli Secretariat	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	14 Jan 1926	Probably Turin	1943 or 1944	In 1953 described as active in PCI Youth Federation for many years and one of three key youth leaders	First, Amendola; then Togliatti/Longo; in early 1970 was pro-Berlinguer	Avanguardia
Armando Cossutta Secretariat	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	2 Sep 1926	Milan	1944	Anti-fascist activity	Longo	No
Alessandro Natta Secretariat	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	7 Jan 1918	Imperia (Piedmont)	1945	As prisoner organized anti-Fascist groups	Moved closer to Amendola early 1970	Director of Rinsacita
Carlo Gelluzzi Secretariat	No prolonged residence in USSR reported	2 Dec 1919	Florence	1943	Yes	Ingrao formerly Amendola	Toscana Nuova Rinsacita



position of greater loyalty to the Soviet Union than either Berlinguer or Ingrao. In this way Amendola has strengthened his position with the party rank and file. Most of the ordinary party members did not like the PCI's condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. They tended to rationalize the Soviet action as justified by facts unknown to the Italians. They suggested that the Soviets rightly maintained secrecy on matters important to the security of the international Communist movement and indicated a belief that questioning Moscow's actions was likely to harm the solidarity of the Communist movement.

Amendola's pro-Soviet stance also netted him a certain amount of support from the Old Stalinists, a group holding about five percent of the seats on the Central Committee. This group is probably more important than its numbers indicate since its members, who are mostly in their sixties, have ties of long standing in Moscow. Members of this group were somewhat more sympathetic to Ingrao's hard line than to Amendola's reformism in the period immediately following Togliatti's death, but have been reluctant to countenance the continuing critical attitude of Berlinguer and Ingrao toward Soviet guidance over the past two years.

Amendola is the party's principal leader in Naples and over a number of years has had close ties with the PCI in the South. He undoubtedly gains some strength from this fact, but the area is far from an Amendola preserve. Half the PCI federations in both Rome and Naples are reported to be strongly sympathetic to some of Amendola's enemies.

Amendola has strength in the Red Belt. Guido Fanti, the top-ranking Communist in the region of Emilia Romagna—where almost a third of all PCI members live—is consistently described as Amendoliano. Elio Gabbuggiani, the principal Communist official in Tuscany, is also a member of this faction.

#### **The Ingrao Faction**

Pietro Ingrao's strength lies in the fact that his ideological position is closer to the traditional idea of Communism. Much of his strength is latent. A warming in his relations with Soviet party leaders would probably result in a swing to Ingrao within the PCI because his line is basically attractive to a number of first-line leaders.

Ingrao is particularly closely associated with Umbria, the third of the Red Belt regions. The PCI leader there, Piero Conti, is an Ingrao man. He is

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also one of the few PCI leaders with a labor background. The comparative record of Ingrao's Umbria and Amendola's Emilia Romagna and Tuscany over the next year or so is likely to influence the outcome of the factional struggle within the party. The relative poverty of Ingrao's territory would seem to stack the cards against him, but greater labor loyalty, if it should materialize, would be a considerable asset.

Ingrao is by far the most attractive of the top leaders to the dissident Manifesto group. These dissidents include five federal deputies, although the total formal membership is estimated below 5,000. The Manifesto group has a number of sympathizers who have remained within the party, however, including Neapolitan Deputy Maria Antonietta Macciocchi,\* who was one of three PCI members to re-establish party contact with Peking in late October 1970.

#### **The Berlinguer Faction**

Deputy Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer, of course, has the strength of possession or near possession of the levers of power. Since Secretary General Longo's stroke in 1968, Berlinguer more often than not has played the role of chief of the party.

Berlinguer is disliked by the old Stalinists for his criticism of the Soviets. He is disliked by the Manifesto dissidents for supporting the national government's austerity measures as the best way in the long run to achieve worker benefits. He is disliked by Amendola and Ingrao because they want his job. The Soviets seem not to have had a warm relationship with the deputy secretary general in recent years.

Berlinguer comes from Sardinia, which is not much of an asset in Italian politics. He was, however, a protégé first of Togliatti and then of Longo. One of his greatest strengths may lie in the desire of many Italian Communist leaders for continuity. While Ingrao would push for an alliance with left-wing Catholics and Amendola for a new alliance with the Socialists, Berlinguer creates the impression that he would keep the party together as the party of the opposition, moving it gradually along its path toward an increasingly influential role as the party of constructive opposition.

By early 1970 power within the PCI appeared to be shifting from Berlinguer and the ailing Longo to Amendola. Longo was still in effective

*\*See Bibliography*

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control, however, and in early fall of 1970 put through a reorganization of the party, which seemed to give something to every faction but most to Berlinguer. Berlinguer has retained his job as acting secretary general as well as his positions on the politburo and secretariat, although he was made a mere ordinary member of a new international affairs commission headed by pro-Soviet Giancarlo Fajetta. Simultaneously, moreover, the chief target of Soviet criticism in recent months, Carlo Galluzzi, was promoted to the PCI secretariat. A number of other transfers and new appointments of somewhat contradictory tendencies were also made. The prospect remains one of periodic strain but no break in CPSU-PCI ties.

### III. PCI RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW

PCI relations with Moscow\* are a constant consideration in the party's policy positions as well as in its top personnel choices. The Italian party has long been the most independent major Communist party in the free world. It is nevertheless strongly influenced by the CPSU. The Italian party's movement toward autonomy, which reached a brisk pace at the time of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, has since faltered.

In early 1956 during the furor over de-Stalinization, the Italian party, even though torn by internal dissension, nevertheless maintained its support of Moscow. Late in 1956, the crisis over the Soviet invasion of Hungary shook not only the ordinary party members but the PCI leadership as well. Perhaps it was only further developments—Suez, primarily, and Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact—that enabled the Italian Communist leadership, which supported the Soviet action as "a grievous necessity," to regain control.

Despite considerable party talk during the 1960s of possible divergence from Soviet political positions, the PCI again failed to show independence in the dispute over the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. There were serious differences within the party, with Giorgio Amendola, who has taken a pro-Soviet position in the past two years, opposing the strong Soviet support for the Arabs. Pietro Ingrao, who has been strongly critical of the Soviets in Czechoslovakia, endorsed Moscow's position in this case. In no instance, however, did the Communist press or the party leadership publicly criticize the Soviets. Although at first the party lagged behind the Soviets in pro-Arab expressions, within a few weeks the PCI line was fully in harmony with Moscow's.

The major test and the high point thus far of Italian Communist independence from Moscow was, of course, the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. The Italian Communists believed that the decentralization of the international Communist movement as exemplified in Prague's experiment was important to their domestic political success. As the Czechoslovak crisis developed, the Italian Communist leaders sought both publicly and privately to dissuade the Soviets from violent action. The intervention, when it came, shocked the party, and the leaders decided on immediate censure.

*\*See Appendix B for details on bureaucratic channels*

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During the week after the censure, all Communist federations throughout Italy ratified the leadership [redacted] Below the federation level, however, local PCI leaders expressed doubt and disagreement. Particularly among older Communists, there was some tendency to trust the Soviets.

After the intervention, the PCI made a strong effort to rally international Communist opposition to the Soviet action. The Italians wanted to protect the Dubcek government, if possible, but in any case to distinguish the Italian Communist position clearly and unmistakably from that of the Soviets. The PCI made a special point of working with its French counterpart and held consultations with other West European parties, including the British, the Austrians, and the Spanish.

The Italian Party's stand against Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia represented a new degree of independence. The PCI was for some months unequivocal and persistent in criticizing the Soviet action. It was in the forefront of efforts to strengthen opposition to the Soviets in Communist parties throughout the free world. In addition, during the first few months after the intervention, the Italian Communist leadership gave every sign of an unusual degree of cohesion, and Secretary General Luigi Longo's position seemed strengthened.

The Soviets have since made unremitting and partly successful efforts to bring the PCI back into line. In such efforts, they use financial and personal pressures and stress the need for conformity to CPSU views in foreign policy positions more than in domestic political affairs. The PCI muted its criticism but has never recanted its condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

#### **Financial Relations**

The PCI has decreased its financial dependence on the Soviets over the past 15 years but has never managed without substantial Soviet funds and would find it difficult to do so, at least for the present and immediate future. In the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis, from the fall of 1968 to the spring of 1969, the PCI worried about—and sought to prepare for—the possibility that the Soviets might suddenly reduce or even eliminate their direct cash subsidy to the Italian party. More recently, CPSU-PCI relations have become warmer, and as a result Italian Communists have adopted a more relaxed attitude toward party expenses.



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In the mid-1950s the annual budget for the PCI itself and its subsidies to various organizations amounted to \$11,000,000. Of this amount, \$7,500,000 came from foreign Communist parties or countries, primarily the USSR.

At present the PCI budget seems to be running at least as high as \$15,000,000-\$20,000,000 annually, with the direct cash subsidy from the Soviets estimated at \$4,500,000. The party's income from Italian trade with the Soviets, which is carried out by import and export companies affiliated with the PCI, probably does not exceed \$2,000,000. Other party income from Communist countries comes from trade with Romania, which was arranged in early 1969 and was scheduled to net the party \$700,000, and reportedly a similar commercial deal with Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Italian party appears to have moved to a position where it is providing more than half of its own financing.

The differing Soviet and Italian attitudes toward Dubcek's Czechoslovakia provoked a conflict of considerable intensity between the two parties. The Soviets believed initially that they could impose their will on the Italians by tightening the purse strings. In September 1968 President Podgorny criticized the Italian Party as revisionist and as having declined to a social democratic position, but said the price of election to 10 or 15 parliamentary seats would bring it and other Western Communist parties into line.

Throughout the winter of 1968-1969, PCI circles were rife with reports of an impending reduction and/or suspension of Soviet financial aid. By early November 1968 the PCI had appointed a committee, chaired by Alessandro Cossutta, to work out a program of rigid economy in preparation for the Soviet cut. The plan called for a 40-50 percent reduction in headquarters personnel and the party press and an austerity regime across the board. The party also initiated studies of ways to increase income.

By early April of 1969 the party apparently believed that it could make a sufficient budget cut to be substantially independent of Soviet funds. Italian Communist leaders repeatedly referred to French Communist subservience to the Soviet Union and to the French Party's financial dependence on the CPSU, which in the Italian view had enforced French obedience.

By the time of the international Communist party conference of June 1969, the Czech crisis had receded considerably. Both Italian and Soviet Communist leaders put considerable effort into burying their differences and presenting a relatively united front to the world. Subsequently the threat of

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a Soviet fund suspension has gradually receded. By the summer of 1970, Italian Communist leaders again appeared to be taking a relatively relaxed view of the party's budget, although they still indicated an intention of avoiding what they characterized as the excessive dependence on the CPSU by the French. [redacted]

#### **Other Pressures**

The political pressures which the CPSU can exert are various and in the long run may be more effective than financial pressures. In October 1968 a number of party sections received anonymous pamphlets in the mail which attacked Czechoslovak "counterrevolutionaries." These pamphlets undoubtedly strengthened the low-level elements of the party in their objections to the PCI leadership's criticism of the Soviets. In this same month, PCI leader Giorgio Amendola, an advocate of Czech liberalization prior to the Soviet intervention, was noted playing down Czechoslovakia and emphasizing domestic issues instead. Amendola was said to have based his action on his belief that criticism of the Soviets was unpopular with the rank and file. At first this attitude seemed to net Amendola very little, but by mid-1969 a split was evident at the top levels of the party between Amendola, supported by the Soviets, and Enrico Berlinguer, deputy to ailing Secretary General Longo. Amendola had thus won the position of chief opponent to Berlinguer for succession as Secretary General.

In other more open forms of pressure, Soviet officials visiting Italy or receiving the Italians in Moscow comment on the relative acceptability of various PCI leaders and may suggest additions or deletions to PCI delegations. Soviet Embassy officials in Rome also indicate those Italian Communists who have their confidence by working with them more closely. The

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more acceptable party members apparently are given greater access to such classified material as Soviet Embassy briefings on the state of Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviets make insistent suggestions for the demotion of the least acceptable party members. The effectiveness of Soviet pressure over the past 50 years of the party's life gives considerable weight within the PCI to even the mildest Soviet representation.

### Concerns of the CPSU

The most severe strains in Soviet relations with the PCI have all been connected with critical Italian Communist attitudes toward Soviet policies outside Italy: the denunciation of Stalin, the intervention in Hungary, the Middle East crises of 1967 and 1970, and the Czechoslovakia invasion. The clearest statement of Soviet priorities in this regard came during the visit of the former chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department. When Aleksey Stepanovich Belyakov came to Italy in the fall of 1969, he sharply told PCI leaders that they had implemented only a few of the Moscow International Communist Conference decisions, such as supporting the North Vietnamese, and were lax on vital points such as German revanchism and the Middle East situation. The PCI position on the Middle East, Belyakov said, appears to be one only of principle, not an active one, as the CPSU would prefer. And as for China, the CPSU cannot tolerate any political interference by other Communist parties. He characterized the PCI's position on foreign matters as dictated not by political reality but by expediency and said the PCI must be more attentive to the principal directives of the Moscow party conference, especially on the German and Middle Eastern questions.

On domestic affairs, Belyakov was less critical. He seemed most interested in the PCI role in current Italian affairs and stressed the need for the PCI to work for unity of action with all leftist forces in the country, Catholics included, and to avoid at all costs being a divisive force. Belyakov placed considerable emphasis on the need for the PCI to develop ties with the Italian Proletarian Socialists, the Italian Socialists, and the Unitary Socialists and expressed an interest in having maximum publicity given to these efforts in Europe.

The Soviets have intervened in PCI personnel matters occasionally, but their motivation appears to be largely that of curbing Italian Communist criticism of the USSR and its policies. Thus the head of the Italy-USSR friendship society was replaced at Soviet instigation because he had been hostile to the Soviets over the Czechoslovak affair. A number of prominent Communists were "suspended indefinitely" because of their backing of the

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dissident monthly *Il Manifesto*. *Manifesto* has been critical of the PCI on a number of fronts, but the weight of evidence suggests that the Soviets insisted on the ouster from the party of the *Manifesto* defenders only because of *Manifesto's* role in criticizing the Soviets and their sycophants in the French Communist Party.



#### IV. WHY VOTE COMMUNIST?

Total PCI voting strength has increased in every national election since the Second World War but is unevenly distributed throughout the country. The rising vote occurs despite falling party membership. This phenomenon can be attributed to an extraparty vote accruing to the party for varying reasons: traditional, pragmatic, and political.

##### Geographic Variation in Vote


One basic cause of geographic variation in Communist strength is the difference in the historical role played by the clergy. In the "White" provinces the clergy are remembered as defenders of Italian national aspirations under the Austrian occupation of the area during the centuries of emerging nationalism prior to 1860. The "Red" provinces, on the other hand, have much the same territory as the former Papal States and have a long tradition of anticlericalism.

A second historical factor in the geographic variation of Communist strength is the difference between the roles played by the PCI in the north and in the south in the 1943-45 period. With the fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943 and the conclusion of a separate armistice between Italy and the Allies, the country was divided into two zones, with the central and northern areas still under German occupation and the southern areas under Allied occupation. In the south, after a period of indecision, the PCI under Togliatti offered to cooperate with all groups, including the largely discredited Monarchists, in order to fight the Germans. Meanwhile, in German-occupied central and northern Italy, Luigi Longo, who had been a top Communist military leader in the Spanish Civil War, began to organize guerrilla warfare. The armed Resistance against the Germans and the Italian puppet regime from the autumn of 1943 to the general uprising of April 25, 1945 was not a Communist monopoly, but more than 50 percent of the partisans were under Communist command. The PCI's achievements in the Resistance gave the party great prestige in these areas with the population at large. Furthermore, its control over thousands of men and women in partisan units gave the party an opportunity to carry on political indoctrination in an emotionally charged atmosphere and to recruit party members.

The difference between the Communist role in northern and southern Italy in 1943-45 largely explains the difference between the two areas in the Communist vote of 1946. A number of explanations, none totally convincing, have been offered for the sharp increase in the PCI vote in the South and



# **GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN PCI'S PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE- FOUR NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1946-1968**



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Islands between 1946 and 1953, but the most convincing probably is the party's close association with land reform. In any case, the gain evidently occurred primarily at the expense of the Liberal party, which polled 14.0 percent in the South in 1946 and only 3.8 percent in 1953. The Liberals, who in earlier years had stood for reform, in the postwar period have come to be regarded as the conservative voice of big business.

Since 1953, the Communist Party has gained in voting strength in all sections of the country. The PCI's approach to a solid two fifths of the vote in the Red Belt is providing the party with increasing experience in municipal, provincial, and now regional government. The Communists are doing almost as well in the South (where Giorgio Amendola has his roots), as in the Industrial Triangle, which is more closely associated with Luigi Longo. In the parliamentary elections of 1968, only the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia) showed a drop compared to 1963. (The drop occurred in Sicily rather than in Enrico Berlinguer's home island of Sardinia.)

#### The Extraparty Vote

Why the Communist vote stays high and even increases despite the decline in Communist Party membership has never been clear beyond argument and is not so today. The explanation most often given is that the Communist vote includes a large protest vote; i.e., that the Italian voter believes a vote for the Communists is the clearest way for him to protest against the incumbent government's inefficiency, corruption, reactionary nature, bureaucratic excesses, and/or failure to carry out social reforms.

In a sense, any vote for a nongovernment party is a protest against the government. The term "protest vote" in interpretations of Italian elections, however, means that the voter would not vote Communist if he thought the Communists might win, that he votes Communist only as a signal to the government parties to mend their ways. That there is some validity to the concept of the protest vote is suggested by a survey reported by Tarrow showing that 22 percent of Communist voters would vote for the Christian Democratic Party if that party and the PCI were the only parties in Italy. To explain the vote for the PCI wholly as a protest of this nature is, however, a serious exaggeration.

Some other segments of PCI electoral support can be categorized as the ancestral tendency vote, the conservative vote in Red regions, the can't-beat-something-with-nothing vote and, according to indications from the respected DOXA survey organization, the vote of those who believe in Communist ideals but are not members of the party.

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**The Ancestral Tendency Vote**—A number of commentators have made the point that Italians tend to vote as their fathers voted before them. In truth, it would be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to explain the stability of Italian voting patterns—in contrast, for example, to those in the United States—on any other basis.

Robert Evans\* highlights the consistent patterns in Bologna. There, anticlerical voting tendencies have persisted for generations, a legacy of centuries of poor administration of the Papal States. In recent years a *modus vivendi* has been worked out between the Cardinal and the administration, but latent anticlericalism remains.

Republicanism as an underlying factor is at least as strong. In 1870, when Italians generally rejoiced over Rome's inclusion in the kingdom of Italy, the Bolognese played hymns to Garibaldi and booed the Royal March. The local administration voted that funds allotted for celebrating the King's birthday be canceled. In 1946, the first move of the Bologna administration after taking part in voting out the monarchy was to remove Victor Emmanuel's statue from the center of the main square. Still today the Monarchist Party is conspicuously unpopular with Bologna's voters.

Socialism also has a long tradition in Bologna. At the turn of the century, Socialists were in the local government coalition and two represented the area in the national parliament. In 1914, the Socialists won 48 of 60 seats on the Municipal Council. Bologna's Socialists further increased their strength in national elections in 1919 and in municipal elections in 1920 before the disappearance of normal political life under Fascism from 1922 until 1943. In the early postwar period, Communists and Socialists were allied, thus enabling the PCI to benefit from the whole tradition of Bolognese socialism.

**The Conservative Vote in the Red Regions**—Some businessmen in the Red Belt vote Liberal or Christian Democratic for national government officials but Communist in local elections because they do not want to disturb the status quo. Other PCI supporters who have conservative tendencies can be found working in the intricate net of Communist-owned cooperatives and other business activities throughout the Red Belt, but particularly in Emilia Romagna. Commentators on the 1956 election in Bologna reported the absence of radicalism also, and noted that the forward-looking reform candidate was badly defeated by the Communist who promised a stand-pat administration. A conservative bias to the PCI vote in the Red Belt is further suggested by the fact that an estimated 53 percent of the Communist vote in Bologna comes from women, who tend in Italy to vote for the party in power.

*\*See Bibliography*

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**The Can't-Beat-Something-With-Nothing Vote**—The PCI wins many votes through behavior that any American politician would regard as just good politics in the tradition of "you-can't-beat-something-with-nothing." The party pays attention to choosing attractive candidates, some of whom campaign hard on a door-to-door basis. The party has a year-round organization, a large number of dedicated and disciplined campaign workers, and probably more money for campaigns than any other Italian party except the Christian Democrats. Perhaps above all, many PCI candidates run as incumbents who have long been doing favors for their constituents both in parliament and out.

**Idealistic or Sympathetic Vote**—There is no reliable way to measure this component of the Communist vote. Italians themselves consider it a large contributor, according to a DOXA survey in 1970.

**Question**—Many ask how the PCI, which has only a couple of million (sic) members, wins so many more votes in the elections (for example, in 1968: 8.5 million). Here are some of the explanations which are given when one asks this question.

Please say, for each explanation, whether you think it correct or mistaken.

	Correct	Mistaken	Don't Know
A. Many voters really accept Communist ideals, but do not believe it necessary to take out a party card.	58.1	23.3	18.6
B. Those voters, even when non-Communist, who want radical change, understand that only the PCI has the necessary force to impose such a change.	33.4	41.7	24.9
C.* Many voters, having lost faith in all the other parties, vote "per protesta" in favor of PCI.	53.5	28.4	18.1
D.* Even voters opposed to Communism vote PCI to force the other parties to do something.	37.5	36.5	26.0
E. Many voters think that PCI leaders are more honest than the representatives of the other parties.	20.6	53.2	26.2
F. Those who feel victimized by the present system understand that the "bosses" fear only the PCI, and it is for this that those in this category give their vote to the PCI.	36.8	33.7	29.5
G. Many vote for the PCI out of hostility to the priests.	31.2	48.5	20.3

\*In terms of the argument on p. 2 Category D and not Category C refers to the protest vote.

## V. REDS IN GOVERNMENT

The long-standing cliché that no Communist party can come to power far from Soviet or Chinese borders has been largely demolished by the Cuban and then the Chilean example. Now the question as to Italian Communist capabilities for government no longer seems far-fetched. It is possible that PCI experience to date in local and regional government and in the national legislature will shed some light on the ways in which the future may answer the question

### Communists in Local Government

Communist participation in local government has been constructive and popular and is one of the most effective arguments among Italians for accepting Communists into national government. The outstanding example of a local Communist government in Italy is in Bologna, the largest city in a non-Communist country to have had uninterrupted Communist rule for the past quarter century.

The principal characteristics of the local administration during the first 10 or 15 years after the Communists came to power in 1945 were a sober financial policy, municipalization, and popular day-to-day administration. So far as financial policy is concerned, the Bolognese Communists for most of their tenure have been orthodox in the sense that revenues have covered expenditures. This record in local finance enabled the Communist Party throughout Italy to point to Bologna as a model of local administration.

In the matter of tax levies, the PCI took a relatively progressive position by Italian standards. The local administration with considerable success imposed a graduated income tax (known as the "family tax" and exempting about half the population) for a major segment of the city's revenue.

A second important point of local administration policy is municipalized enterprise. All public utilities are controlled by the town hall, including the transportation system. In these enterprises, town hall policy has been marked by efforts at modernization. Examples include the total mechanization of garbage collection and disposal and the progressive transformation of the transport system from tramways to trolley and standard buses. Caution in both finance and innovation has been the focus for many of the attacks leveled against the PCI administration as too conservative.



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A possibly unique characteristic of Bologna is the municipalized pharmacy, which the town hall established in order to provide medicine to people of limited means at reasonable cost. Previously medicine was purchased in private stores, which were then reimbursed by the town hall. From the one outlet which opened in 1959 in the town hall, the municipalized pharmacy has expanded until it blankets the entire town, despite the strong protests of the pharmacists' lobby.

So far as normal administrative policy is concerned, the Communist government has provided public works, street and building maintenance, lighting, and expansion of services generally satisfying the demands of the town. Considerable was also done in the housing field; the town hall directly or indirectly financed some 15 percent of all construction in the period prior to the adoption of town planning.

Although town services such as road maintenance were considerably better around election time, by and large what had to be done in the way of municipal service was done. Town planning, however, was not undertaken during the first decade of Communist rule.

In the electoral campaign of 1956, the Christian Democrats advocated modernization of services, more planning, the adoption of sociological methods to survey the town's needs, and the creation of a modern center for statistical studies. A repeated theme of the campaign was that the Communists had a do-nothing, standstill policy. The Communists were the victors in the campaign, in part, according to Evans, because the voters feared that election of the Christian Democrat mayoral candidate might mean radical change. Subsequently, however, the Bolognese PCI bit by bit adopted the program on which the Christian Democrats had campaigned.

A pioneer among Italian towns in working out its plan, Bologna divided itself into fourteen sectors or neighborhoods and established a council for each, presided over by a delegate of the mayor. This system became operative in 1964 and has provided effective decentralization. The city council had agreed that the positions should be filled in approximate proportion to its own composition, therefore, in a noteworthy demonstration of working cooperation between Communists and non-Communists, several of Bologna's neighborhood "assistant mayors" are Christian Democrats and several others are Socialists.

In the housing field, the Town Hall purchased some 290,000 square meters of land for the construction of low-cost housing, reselling at a low

price under utilization controls. This action stimulated building and curtailed land speculation.

The local school-construction policy put Bologna in the forefront of Italian towns in this field. The plan that was adopted sought to increase the number of buildings and to decentralize as well, at a cost of 8.5 billion lire (\$14,000,000). At the same time the University was assigned almost \$1,000,000 for scientific research; \$1,160,000 was allocated to a newly created faculty of political science, and almost \$100,000 was budgeted for scholarship aid. Other major projects in the city's first plan were a beltway around Bologna and substantial airport improvements.

Changing Communist concepts of local administration have been influenced by the party's general status. During the period from 1945 to 1956, when a revolutionary take-over of the country appeared possible and when the rigid Stalinist approach was mandatory, local administration was seen simply as a means of seizing power and of retaining control of the unions. Since Secretary General Togliatti made clear in the late 1950s that the PCI would seek power through parliamentary means, control of the local administration has been considered a means of coming to power legally rather than extralegally. It is also seen as a way of proving that the party has the right to share in the national decision-making processes and thus can avoid being isolated. PCI leader Giorgio Amendola has used these administrations as one of the bases for his repeated claims that the PCI is already a government party.

#### **Communists in Regional Government**

Fear of Communist dominance in the Red Belt until recently delayed the establishment of 15 new regional governments that were called for in the constitution of 1948. Elections for these regional governments were finally held in June 1970. As expected, Communist-dominated governments were chosen and have since been installed in the three central Italian regions of Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria. The effective delimitation of regional governmental powers will be resolved only over the next year or so, but it is clear that regional government will have a substantial voice at least in economic planning, a field of particular interest to the PCI.

A Communist leader in Tuscany last spring stated his view of the party's three broad objectives in regional government. The regional administrations of the PCI should be models of good government to enhance the party's "respectability"; the PCI should seek to work with the several parties

[REDACTED]

of the center toward single mutually desired goals to make the concept of center-Communist cooperation more familiar and acceptable; and, third, the party should seek to use its regional power to exert influence on national policies in Rome.

From an administrative standpoint, the PCI is likely to govern the Red Belt well. The Communists' reputation for effective local government obviously accounts for much of their continuing electoral success in the area, particularly among fringe elements who are unattracted by and who perhaps even dissent from traditional Marxist ideology. Regional government emphasis upon such popular issues as schools, hospitals, low-cost housing, and the like were promised before the election. Presumably in those few important communities in the area, such as Faenza in Romagna and Lucca in Tuscany, which have until now remained out of Communist hands there will be a concerted effort to demonstrate the beneficence of the regional PCI government. As in Bologna, a PCI regional administration may be expected to deal with and, to an extent, cater to business interests, rather than to alienate them or otherwise discourage further investment in the region. Meanwhile, the established net of cooperatives, social and recreation clubs, and other party-controlled activities will continue to "look after" everybody who can be attracted to their ranks. All in all, not much will change in the life of the average inhabitant of the area, which is already largely governed by local PCI administrations.

Secure in its own pre-eminence in the three Red regions, the PCI has made clear it will welcome participation by any of the democratic parties. The Communists' final target is, of course, the Christian Democrats, whose partnership would supply precedent for similar participation by themselves in other regions where the Christian Democrats have the upper hand, and ultimately in national government. This willingness to "share" regional authority is frequently being expressed in language reminiscent of the days of cooperation in wartime resistance. Bologna's ex-Mayor Guido Fanti suggested some months before the June elections that if the regions are to "have a decisive function in the process of democratic evolution," the various parties should "not presume to express in themselves the whole of social and economic truth, but should function as the political and idealistic supporting beams of true democracy." More specifically, PCI Provincial Secretary Vincenzo Galetti has declared: "We believe that whether on the local, regional or national plane, leadership should not pertain to any one party by itself, no matter how strong. We are for a collaboration among political forces of democratic orientation. Let us not place emphasis upon groupings, but upon problems, upon things to achieve."

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National considerations and pressures plus grass-roots opposition will probably contain those of the local Christian Democratic leader who might be tempted to enter a formal alliance with the PCI. Nevertheless, there will probably be common programs on specific issues and much informal cooperation, particularly at the committee level in the Regional Assembly. Ample precedent for both exists in the multiparty Regional Planning Commission, which although nominally apolitical has in fact brought together representatives of all the prominent parties in remarkable harmony and even unanimity. Such regional cooperation will probably start slowly and increase gradually, it will be carefully justified at each step by public need and delineated by reaffirmations of continuing opposition on matters of "politics" as distinct from "administration." This in effect would be only a continuation of what has been happening increasingly in local government of this area over the last ten years.

Speaking of regional influence on national policy in an interview published by the influential newspaper *La Stampa* Communist leader Elio Gabbuggiani said, "I will give you an example. The economy of Tuscany is tied to the foreign market. Our trade is great. It is logical that Tuscany should want to have relations with all the countries in the world, that it should want a policy of peace, a policy of overcoming blocs. Tuscany therefore should make itself heard by the national government on this subject."

*La Stampa* comments that the example cited by Gabbuggiani suggests how strong a pressure instrument on Rome the regions can be, especially those governed by the opposition. Gabbuggiani reportedly smiled as he talked and said, "It is not that we want to make foreign policy. But in a debate in Parliament on foreign trade, for example, it will be right that we Tuscans put forth our point of view. How? With proposals of law to the Chamber (the Regions can do this) or with orders of the day."

#### Communists in the National Government

The PCI is the second largest party in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with more than one fourth of the seats in each house. Throughout the postwar period, Italian governments have maintained their independence of Communist voting strength. Each government has insisted that major legislation could be passed only with a majority consisting of non-Communist votes. Communists have thus been unable to use their parliamentary strength in voting trades on major legislation. Communist

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voting strength has to date had two major outlets. First, Communist votes and evidently Communist amendments are accepted in committee where minor legislation is passed. Second, Communist votes are not only accepted but warmly sought for the election of president of the republic. This is an indirect election, taking place in Parliament, and the candidates tend to be men who split the vote of the Christian Democrats. When this happens, the candidate who wins the Communist bloc, as Giuseppe Saragat did in 1964, wins the presidency. Italy's next presidential election takes place in December 1971, and leading candidates have already begun to maneuver for Communist support.

Under the incumbent government of Emilio Colombo the PCI is playing an increasingly important part in the passage of major legislation. Party support was indispensable to passage of Italy's first divorce legislation. The Christian Democrats, who opposed the bill, agreed that enactment of this legislation over their party's opposition would be accepted by Christian Democrat Prime Minister Colombo and would not be considered parliamentary repudiation of his government. The divorce legislation is particularly significant as a symbol of Italian independence of the Vatican. The PCI also sought to play an essential role in passage of a major economic and financial decree law, which is central to the Colombo government's program.

Other Communist gains on the level of the national government seem to stem from the influence on Christian Democrats of the Vatican's reorientation of its attitude toward Communist countries. In the fall of 1970, for example, right-wing Christian Democrat Andreotti teamed up with the PCI in an open Chamber vote on a legislative amendment.

#### Outlook

The Italian Communist Party bids fair to increase its respectability and its governmental role over the next few years. Catholic-Communist hostility with its obvious political repercussions will probably continue the decline shown in the following poll by the respected Italian polling organization DOXA:

"Can one be a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time?"



	1953	1961	1963	1968	1970
Yes	21	19	28	36	44
No	67	60	56	47	44
Don't Know	12	21	16	17	12

Nevertheless, no one of the four members of the center-left—neither the three now in the cabinet nor the Republicans who have belonged to the previous center-left governments—is now prepared to bring the PCI into the cabinet. All four are ready to concede the theoretical possibility that the PCI may evolve politically to the point of being acceptable to the other parties. The differences among the four center-left parties and their various leaders lie in the attitudes toward the PCI which they advocate for the interim period, that is, from now until that future time when the PCI should have evolved into a democratic party.

Of the four parties, the most friendly to the Communists is the Socialist Party and the least friendly is the Italian Social Democratic Party, with the Christian Democrats and the Republicans generally taking positions between the two Socialist groups.

The Socialists and the left-wing Christian Democrats generally believe that the democratic parties should work with the Communists whenever feasible so as to encourage the Communist Party's independence and its evolution toward the status of an Italian democratic party. The Social Democrats, the Republicans, and the more conservative Christian Democrats believe that the Communists should show independence of Moscow and respect for democratic processes first and that they should only subsequently be accepted in the political arena.

A number of possible political developments may bring about sufficient change in the center-left parties to permit the PCI's entrance into the government. Some of the developments most often considered concern 1) the presidential election of 1971, 2) a split in the Christian Democratic party and/or a split in the PCI, 3) uncontrolled labor trouble, and 4) substantial far left gains in the elections of 1973.

- 1) The Italian president is elected in joint parliamentary session in which 58 regional delegates also participate, rather than by

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direct vote of the electorate. The leading candidates come from the center-left parties, and in fact this year both are Christian Democrats. The vote is secret, the center-left vote divides among the various candidates, and the Italian Communist Party, which votes as a disciplined unit, is expected to be as decisive in the choice of Italy's next president as it was in the choice of incumbent President Saragat. The successful candidate may well have made some under-the-table concessions to the Communists in return for the winning vote, but the concessions are most unlikely to be big enough to bring the Communists into the national cabinet.

- 2) A split in the Christian Democratic and/or the Communist Party is often posited as a logical preliminary to Communist entrance into the cabinet. Predictions of such splits have been made on a number of occasions in the past, but both parties, in fact, appear to have strong inner cohesiveness. Close examination suggests that neither party is likely to divide.
- 3) Uncontrolled labor trouble is perhaps a more likely prelude to Communist entrance into the cabinet than the other hypotheses. Both political and labor leaders have been concerned by the wildcat strikes of the past 18 months. These strikes, which have begun almost spontaneously as a result of a climate of unrest rather than from specific grievances, are contagious. Over the past year organized labor has been forced to participate in strikes which began as small wildcat efforts. It is conceivable that one day such strikes will get totally out of hand and that the Christian Democrats and Communists would then join in a kind of grand coalition to impose control. There is no indication, however, that such a development is in the cards for the immediate future.
- 4) Some observers suggest that the far left may make substantial gains in the parliamentary elections of 1973 and consequently be invited into the government. Such a prediction lies in the realm of fantasy. The stability of Italian voting patterns virtually rules out the possibility of this development. The pro-Moscow parties, which until the mid-1950s included the Socialists and now include the Proletarian Socialists, have polled roughly a third of the electorate in all the postwar elections. A gain of two percent for the PCI, or the far left generally, in the

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1973 elections would be regarded as a substantial gain and in fact as alarmingly large. A gain of this size would be impressive and helpful to the Party's prestige, but it would not be nearly enough to give cabinet posts to the PCI.

Amendola has expressed the opinion that the PCI is already a government party. There is a good deal of merit to his position. As has been explained in the three preceding sections on Reds in Government, the PCI is already exercising authority at various levels and in various areas. With the establishment of regional governments and the center-left's greater willingness to accept Communist votes on amendments of national legislation, PCI influence is clearly growing. It is probably more useful to consider the actual and potential impact of the PCI in various policy areas than to concentrate on a possible date for PCI entrance into the national cabinet.

## VI. SPECULATION ON RED POWER IN ROME

### Beyond 1973: Contingencies that would Facilitate a PCI Cabinet Role

In the long run, the evolution in the PCI's position within international Communism will figure in an important way in the party's power position in Italy. The PCI's essential problem is one of retaining its ties with the international Communist movement and at the same time moving toward a definite identification with Italian national aims. This last, if achieved, would tend to soften the opposition of the other political parties to Communist participation in the government.

For Italian Communists, the internationalism of their movement is essential. A purely Italian party, even though Marxist in ideology, would not satisfy PCI members; many would resign. Some of the aspects of the present feeling of membership in a powerful international movement could probably be retained if the PCI became dominant in a regional European grouping of Communist parties. This would be true even if the group became more distant from the Soviet Union. The group would necessarily include the French party since it is the largest Communist party in Western Europe after the PCI, and it would probably also take in some of the East Europeans including Yugoslavia. In the late 1960s an embryo of such an organization held three regional Communist and left-wing meetings on Mediterranean problems.

A regional European Communist association might be complemented by three other groups of Communist parties, Soviet, Chinese and Latin American in orientation. The four could make up a more loosely organized international movement. In this way the PCI might diminish its dependence on Soviet influence and thus increase its acceptability to the non-Communist Italian parties. At the same time it would retain that identity as part of the international Communist movement which is so essential to its image for the greater part of its members within Italy.

A profound effect on the PCI's prospects for gaining seats in a national cabinet in the 1970s might also arise from the progress of detente. Whatever political developments take place over the next few years—such as perhaps the signing of a SALT treaty—the Europeans are going to feel more and more that the Soviet political system is a relatively permanent feature of the landscape. This trend is already evident; it is demonstrated, for example, in less hostile Vatican attitudes toward the Communist countries. Greater Italian acceptance of the USSR as a normal nation state will be conducive to greater acceptance of a cabinet role for the PCI.



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In addition, developments in Yugoslavia over the next few years may have a marked effect on the PCI's prospects in Italy. Should the decentralization of federal power to the republics, the growth of independent labor influence, the increase in press and student freedom, and the development of more democratic parliamentary proceedings be maintained in the post-Tito period, the PCI's prospects for acceptance on relatively equal terms in Italy would be improved. If the Yugoslav experiment brings about national disintegration, however, or a reimposition of direct Soviet domination, the PCI's prospects in Italy would be correspondingly restricted.

#### **The PCI in a Coalition Government**

If Italy's Communists win a government coalition role, the impact is likely to be more on foreign than on domestic policy. Italy's non-Communist parties and the influential pressure groups share with the PCI a conviction that economic growth should be given priority. In its relations with other political parties, the PCI would emphasize the pragmatic advantages to them of cooperation and would stress that the facilitation of official action depended on some consideration for Communist interests. The PCI would often evoke the common interest of all the cabinet parties in avoiding a resurgence of fascism or militarism. To the limited extent of its capabilities, the PCI would use its labor arm to back up its policy choices. The Soviets would tend to leave Italy's Communists fairly free to make political adjustments in domestic policy but would demand their pound of flesh in the foreign policy field. The Soviets might have some concern about the effects of such a PCI role on the governments of Eastern Europe. PCI participation in the Italian Government would presumably encourage reformist elements in Eastern Europe both to promote their ideas within their own parties and to hope for an eventual softening of Soviet attitudes toward the reformist brand of Communism. It is unlikely that it would pose any short-term problems for Soviet control, however. The Finnish Communist Party until recently shared power in the Finnish Government without any perceptible repercussions in Eastern Europe.

#### **Speculation on PCI Cabinet Preferences**

The PCI has never made clear which cabinet posts it would seek if it should join a coalition government. Most observers of the Italian political scene agree, however, that the PCI would not consider accepting just one cabinet post, even in order to demonstrate its responsibility to non-Communist political parties. In the normal course of events the party could be expected to hold out for eight or ten of Italy's 20-some cabinet posts. While

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the Communists would of course place highest value on such key posts as Defense and Interior, their chances of attaining them initially would be slim. They might be willing to settle for important posts like Treasury or Labor and hope to acquire other vital ministries as they consolidated their position in government. Despite the importance of communications to political control, the PCI would not be likely to prize the Ministry of Communications since radio and television time in Italy is assigned in an election period in accordance with a party's representation in parliament. Hence the PCI already has more time on radio and television for its candidates than any other party except the Christian Democratic.

#### **Economic Policy**

Deputy Secretary General Berlinguer said in a public speech last July that the PCI believes in promoting stable economic growth as the most effective way to increase worker benefits. This is clearly a position with which the democratic parties have no quarrel.

In addition to stress on economic growth, Communist cabinet ministers would play up the concept of state ownership. They would probably push for nationalization of the banks, for example; this would be a splashy popular gesture, although in fact some 80 percent of Italy's banks are already state-owned and state-operated. Communist ministers would undoubtedly also press for the PCI policies of nationalizing pharmacies, expropriating the "sugar barons" who run the sugar refineries in the Red Belt and have long been party targets, and taking over a percentage of urban land for low-income housing.

#### **Press Policy**

The Italian Communists are not likely to be fanatics on the score of press policy, at least in the early stages of their accession to a national government role. On the contrary, their record to date suggests they would probably try to work with the non-Communist press.

In the Red stronghold of Bologna, the party has had a history of pragmatic accommodation in its relationship with the conservative daily *Il Resto del Carlino*. The PCI administration even rewrote its city development plan some years ago to facilitate *Il Resto's* plans for construction of a modern printing plant. This paper, which has links with the Italian equivalent of the National Association of Manufacturers, has continued to have far greater circulation in the city than the Communist press.

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The PCI might also hesitate to attack *La Stampa*, the Italian newspaper of greatest international prestige. *La Stampa* is closely associated with the FIAT industry, which has been working in the USSR on a car and truck plant that appears to be valued by the Soviets.

The PCI's own official newspaper *L'Unita* is already one of Italy's major dailies, while Communist-leaning *Paese Sera* is the leading Roman evening paper. The PCI press gives broad coverage, despite its bias, and has a considerable circulation on its merits.

#### Religious Freedom

Both the PCI and the Soviets have shown a steadily increasing interest in disarming Vatican hostility toward them. It seems most plausible that the Communists in the national government would seek to present themselves to the Vatican as an effective means of communication with the countries of Eastern Europe in which Pope Paul is particularly interested. The PCI would have little to gain and perhaps a good deal to lose if it should display open hostility to the Church at this stage.

#### Military and Police Power

In domestic affairs, the priority target for the PCI in a national government role would be the neutralization of the armed forces and the police. The party has consistently felt the same sort of constant alarm over the possibility of a military coup in Italy that the Soviet Union has had about the possibility of a resurgent German militarist menace. Communist infiltration in the armed services at present is believed slight except in the local police in Communist-administered areas and possibly among the railway police. Enlisted men, particularly in the Army, probably are as sympathetic to Communism as the general population but infiltration of the officer corps appears to be minimal.

The most reasonable way for the Communists to approach the difficult problem of neutralization might be through building up the local police forces under PCI control at the expense, perhaps, of the national police. In any event, the party could be expected to move with extreme caution because it understands that otherwise the threat of a repressive coup would be real.

## Foreign Affairs

A number of observers have long held that neither the PCI nor the democratic parties in Italy care as much about foreign policy as they do about domestic affairs. In political bargaining, however, the PCI is likely to ask for concessions in the foreign policy field, where the interests of the PCI's Soviet mentors lie.

A foreign policy issue of key importance is Italy's membership in NATO. Within Italy, the PCI has never mobilized strong and extensive anti-NATO feeling.

The PCI's anti-NATO demonstration on the occasion of the ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1970 drew only 5,000 participants, and the party exhibited more concern for maintaining law and order than for arousing or exploiting hostility to the Western Alliance.

Nevertheless, the PCI is committed to an anti-NATO position. Its propagandists have made a byword, at least in some circles, of the slogan, "Italy Out of NATO and NATO Out of Italy." Communist pressures, which would be somewhat strengthened by Communist participation in the cabinet, will under any circumstances be exerted to reduce Italy's cooperation with NATO over the next decade.


Communist cabinet ministers in Italy would also push for a swing to the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli dispute and encourage a move to supplant Western oil companies with the national Italian company wherever possible. They would get behind a number of European projects dear to the Soviet heart, such as a Conference on European Security. They would also seek to strengthen West Germany's accommodation with East European countries and to strengthen ties with Communist governments throughout the world.

The principal foreign policy issue on which the PCI would be likely to resist Soviet pressure is that of the European Communities. The Soviets oppose the Six and work against their cohesion. The PCI, on the other hand, because of its common interest with other Italian political parties in the country's economic growth, which they associate with the Communities, would make a strong stand vis-a-vis the Soviets on this issue, and would be unlikely to bow to any Soviet pressures for disruptive tactics. In somewhat the same spirit, PCI cabinet ministers would probably not be particularly responsive to Soviet demands for better trade terms and long-term credits for the USSR.



The themes stressed by CPSU Politburo member Arvid J. Pelshe during his visit to Italy in November 1970 clearly indicate the issues the PCI is now expected to push and give an idea of the wide range of Soviet demands on PCI foreign policy positions. According to a reliable clandestine report, Pelshe said the PCI should attack the foreign policies of the United States as they apply to problem areas, such as the Middle East, the Mediterranean (where, according to Pelshe, the PCI has an important role), Vietnam, and North Korea.

According to Pelshe, the problem of Israel could best be resolved by isolating the Israeli-American relationship from other Western and West European governments. The US should also be accused of "Vietnamizing" the Middle East situation, thereby abandoning the Israelis and Arabs to a bloody crisis of American making. The Italian Government's policy of improving relations with Middle Eastern, African, and East European countries is a useful step in this direction and the PCI should encourage it, Pelshe further stated. Other clandestine reports have emphasized the Soviet interest in a PCI effort to push Soviet objectives in Germany and Berlin.


Italy in the past quarter century has been one of the most pro-US countries in the world. The country is certain to become more independent as growing affluence replaces the devastation of the immediate postwar years and the threat of a Soviet military sweep across Europe recedes. The PCI, in government, would thus have something of a downhill path to take as it responded to Soviet prodding to influence Rome toward a more neutral policy.









## APPENDIX A


































































## APPENDIX B





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